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RECOUPMENT.
The title at the head of this article is frequently met with in
modern reports, and, like most new principles struggling for a place
in our jurisprudence, it has not been accepted with the same signification by the different courts that have passed upon it. Chief Justice Redfield, a few years since, in speaking of recoupment, said:
"The modern use of this term is confessedly so indefinite as to
afford no reasonable grounds upon which it is safe to proceed." I
Since then there have been some decisions and discussions tending
to fix its meaning, or at least to indicate the limits and qualifications
within which it must be eventually developed. It is thought that
not so much a review of the authorities, (which would extend this
article beyond proper limits,) as a plain statement of the results of
such review, might aid in determining the true nature of modern
recoupment-an undertaking which, in its present accomplishment,
may not, we will readily admit, offer the satisfaction which every
one has. the right to expect from a careful examination of a question
or principle of law that has been adjudicated upon as much as this.
The term itself is derived from the French word recouper, which
IBarber vs.
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means, to cut again : hence, to defalk, to discount. The use of it in
the common law is not new, bht it seems recently to have assumed
a new signification. In the time of Lord Coke and before, it implied a mere deduction from the damages claimed by the plaintiff,
on account of part payment of the demand, or a former recovery,
or some analogous fact.' This signification prevailed for a long
time, and it has been retained in some modern cases, but generally
under the name of deduction or reduction of damages,2 which is
perhaps the more proper term for this class of*cases. 3

There are

a few cases in which the ancient meaning as well as name has been
retained. 4 It must be admitted that there is great difficulty sometimes in distinguishing a case of recoupment, under the modern
signification, from a case of reduction of damages.
By the right of recoupment, is now most generally understood
that right on the part of the defendant, in the same action, to claim
damages from the plaintiff, because he has not complied with some
duty or obligation imposed upon him by the same contract upon
which he sues.- It is true that some courts have assumed to extend
1 1 Dyer, 2 b; Pennant's Case, 3 Co. 65; Coulter's Case, 5 Co. 2, 31; Slade's
Case, 4 Co. 94; Lifford's Case, 11 Co. 51, 52; note to Iceley vs. Grew, 6 Nev. &
Mau. 467; Vin. Abr. Discount, Pl. 3, 4, 9, 10; Barber vs. Chapin, 28 Vt. 413.
2 Goodsall vs. Boldero, 9 East, 72; Dalby vs. Life Ins. Co. 15, C. B. 365; Puller vs.
Stansforth, 11 East. 232; Graham vs. Tate, 1 M. & S. 318, 328; Barclay vs.
Stirling, 5 M. & Scl. 6 and 10; Heckscher vs. McCrea, 24 Wend. 304; 2 Denio, 610.
8 2 Par. Con. 246.
4 Saltus vs. Everett, 20 Wend. 267; Stearns vs. Marsh, 4 Denlo. 227.
5 McAllister vs. Reab, 4 Wend. 483; Reab vs. McAllister, 8 Wend. 109; Epperly
vs. Bailey, 3 Ind. 72; Houston vs. Young, 7 Ind. 200; Baker vs. Railsback,
4 Ind. 533; Heaston vs. Colgrove, 3 Ind. 265; Hunter vs. Waldron, 7 Ala.
753; Hatchell vs. Gibson, 13 Ala. 587; Jones vs. Deyer, 16 Ala. 221 ; Robertson
vs. Davenport, 27 Ala. 574; Wheat vs. Dotson, 12 Ark. 699; Robinson vs. Mace,
16 Ark. 97; Brunson vs. Martin, 17 Ark. 270; Allaire vs. Guion, 10 Barb. 55;
Mayor vs. Mabie, 3 Kernan, 151 ; Deming vs. Kemp, 4 Sandf. 147; Peabody vs.
Bloomer, 5 Duer. 678; Culver vs. Blake, 6 B. Mon. 528 ; Boggs vs. Martin, 13 B.
Mon. 239; Tinsley vs. Tinsley, 15 B. Mon. 454; Ward vs. Feller, 3 Mich. 281 ;
Bancroft vs Peters, 4 Mich. 619; Rogers vs. Humphrey, 39 Maine, 382; Higgins
vs. Lee, 16 Ill. 495; Batterman vs. Price, 3 Hill, 172; Lemon vs. Trull, 13 How.
Pr. 248; Timmons vs. Dunn, 4 0. St. 680; Upton vs. Julian, 7 0. 95; Steamer vs.
,Geisse, 3 0. 387; Evans vs. Hall, I Handy, 434.
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the principle of recoupment to actions of tort, but this, we think,
can be shown to be unwarrantable. It has also been extended to
damages or causes of action arising out of the transaction upon
which the plaintiff's action rests, where such damages do not constitute a violation of any contract. But it may be questioned
whether this is not an extension of it beyond those limits in which
it can be applied with certainty. We shall recur to this part of the
subject again.
The reason upon which it rests is an avoidance of the circuity of
action-the obvious convenience of settling opposing breaches of a
contract in one action, instead of resorting to the expense of several. It is somewhat singular that a principle so just and equitable
as this should have waited so long for recognition in a cultivated
system of jurisprudence like our own.
Thus established, it seems to correspond with the reconvention of
the civil law, sometimes termed "demandes incidentes" by the
French writers, in which the defendant was permitted to exhibit his
claim of damages against the plaintiff for allowance, provided it arose
out of or was incidental to the plaintiff's cause of action.
It seems to have been well established and defined in the civil
law, and in the systems of jurisprudence that have emanated from
it- But we think that the common lawyer may have the satisfaction of knowing, that our doctrine of recoupment has not been
introduced from the civil law. For in no case or discourse upon the
subject have we found a single reference to the principle of reconvention as contained in the civil law. Our astonishment, however,
is not so great that the principle was not seized upon and transplanted from the Roman law, where it flourished in undoubted efficiency, as, from its obvious convenience and economy in the administration of justice, it should not have found an original and permanent abiding-place with us at an earlier day.
'0 O'Evres De Pothier,39; 1 White's New Recoplacion, 285; Voet. Tit. de .Judiciis,
n. 78; Code Pr. La. Art. 375; Boyd vs. Warfield, 6 Mart. N. S. 671; La Coste vs.
Bordere, 7 Mart. N. S. 517; Lanassis Syndics vs. Pimpienella, 4 Mart. N. S. 439;
Wilcoxon vs. Buford's heirs, 10 La. 185; Miller vs. Stewart, 12 La. Ann. 170; Knox
vs. Thompson, 12 La. Ann. 114; Morgan vs. Lathrop, Ibid, 257; Zeringer vs. Rixner,
14 La. 385; 2 Hennen's Dig. Tit. P1 8, b.; Walcott vs. Hendrick, 6 Tex. 406.
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As the doctrine is not universally recognized, it might be a work
of profit, as well as curiosity, to glance at the changing phases it
has presented in struggling through the barriers of the common law.
It has been regarded by some, as an unliquidated offset, that has
crept in, in mitigation of the statutes of offset. Perhaps those
statutes have given impulse to it, and in some cases suggested its
existence. But we think traces of it will be found prior to the
statutes of offset. Indeed, long before those statutes, Chief Justice
Hale decided that where there were mutual claims between two parties on account of the same dealings, and one of them became a
bankrupt, the other should be held for the balance only.'
The
deduction from damages allowed by the common law courts was also
2
one step towards the doctrine.
Under the common law system of pleading, which aimed at confining the issues in a suit to a single point, the defendant was deprived of those many defenses which at the present day tend to rescue
the law from its former opprobrium of circuity, expense, and delay.
It was a well-fixed principle of the common law, that fraud
vitiated everything into which it entered.'
That the plaintiff was
guilty of fraud, in the making of a contract, was a perfect defense
to an action brought to enforce it. It soon became apparent, however, that, notwithstanding the plaintiff's fraud, the defendant frequently derived profit and advantage from the transaction. This
led to the doctrine of the recission of contracts, on the ground of
fraud. The defendant was required, on first discovering it, to give
notice of his recission of the contract, to return the subject-matter,
if it was a sale, and to put matters in the same condition as before
the sale or contract, as near as circumstances would admit. After
he had done this, his plea of fraud was a perfect defense, inasmuch
4
as it denied the existence and obligation of the contract.
Chapman vs. Derby, 1 Vern. 117.
3

'Kist

vs. Atkinson, 2 Cowp. 63.

Fermor's Case, 3 Co. 77 ; Bright vs. Engon, 1 Bur. 390; Dingley vs. Robinson,
5 Green]. 127; Ferguson vs. Carrington, 9 Barn. & Cres. 59; 1 Mason, 437; Peak
Cas. 206; Story Con.
495 ; 2 Par. Con. 264; 12 Ark. 703.
4 Steel vs. Brown, 1 Taunt. 381; Deady vs. Harrison, 1 Stark, 60; Mlarson vs.
Bovet, 1 Denio, 69; Tisdale vs. Buckmore, 36 Miine, 161; Herrin vs. Libbey, 36
Maine, 850; Poor vs. Woodburn, 25 Vt. 234.
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Thus the law was established which regards contracts not as void,
but voidable only, on the ground of fraud, at the option of the innocent party. If he failed to manifest his choice of recission by such
acts as we have mentioned, his plea of fraud was no defense, unless it
went to show that, in consequence of the fraud, he had received no
benefit whatever from the contract, or, in other words, that there
had been a total failure of consideration. This could always be
pleaded without any notice of recission. But if the failure of consideration was only partial, and there was no recission, the defendant was driven to his action on the warranty, if there was one, or
to an action for fraud and deceit.' Now, in this country, the courts
have been more ready to admit a partial failure of consideration as
a defense pro tanto, without any notice of recission, where it has
been caused by fraud, than where it is the result merely of a breach
of warranty.' This is admitted by way of recoupment, or reduction
of damages, to avoid circuity of action. In England, it seems that,
for some reason or other, this principle of reduction of damages for
failure of consideration in cases of fraud was not recognized as soon
in such cases as in some others.
In an action on a contract for the price of labor, it was of course
always admitted, that where the defendant received no benefit at all,
there was a total failure of consideration, which was a good defense.3
But, it was originally held, that where any benefit at all was received
by the employer, he could not plead the unskilfulness or negligence
of his employee in the performance of his contract, when sued for
the stipulated price of the labor,' but had to resort to an independent action to avail himself of this circumstance. The defense was
allowed in this class of cases as early as 1806, in abatement of dam. 1 Solomon vs. Turner, 1 Stark. 51; Archer vs. Bamford, 3 Stark, 175; Kimball
vs. Cunningham, 4 Mass. 502; Tye vs. Gwynne, 2 Campb. 346; Pulsifer vs. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234; Harlan vs. Reed, 3 Ham. 0. 285.
'Hills vs. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31; Sill vs. Rood, 15 John, 230; 3f cAllister vs. Reab,
4 Wend. 483 ; Pulsifer vs. Htotchkiss, 12 Conn 234; Lewis vs. Cosgrove, 2 Taunt. 2.
2
Templar vs. McLachlan, 5 Dos. & P. 136 ; Shaw vs. Arden, 9 Bing. 287 ; Day vs.
Nix, 9 Moore, 159; Pulsifer vs. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234; McAlpiue vs. Lee, 12
Conn. 129.
Basten vs. Butter, 7 East. 479.
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ages to the extent of the injury suffered through the negligence of
the plaintiff in depreciating the value of the consideration. The
rule was establishedin Fisher vs. Samuda, 1 Campb. 190, and has met
-with pretty general approval in this country, that the employee
should recover only for the value of what he has done.' It was in
this class of cases that we find the first recognition in England of
the justice and economy of recoupment.
Courts have differed as to the manner in which the evidence of
this failure of consideration should be admitted, and the doctrine
itself was extended with some reluctance to other classes of cases in
which it was equally applicable.
It was admitted by some courts only on the quantum meruit
counts,' and not on the express contract.
A distinction was also taken by some courts, between an action
for the contract price and one upon a note or other security given
to cover the price, the defense of recoupment or reduction not being
allowed in the latter case, on the ground that the security was an
entire and different contract. 3 This distinction has not been generally observed in this country.4 Again, the defense of a failure of
consideration was not formerly allowed, when the action was brought
on a sealed instrument, on-the ground that the seal imported a consideration which could not be contradicted.- This distinction, too,
has disappeared.
In the sale of a chattel with warranty the defendant, when sued
for the price, was not formerly allowed to found any defense on a
breach of the warranty. The sale and the warranty were looked
I Fisher vs. Samuda, 1 Campb. 190; Farnsworth vs. Garrard, 1 Camp. 40; Grant
vs. Burton, 14 John. 377; Spalding vs. Vandercook, 2 Wend. 481; Crowninshield
vs. Robinson, 1 Mason, 93; 7 East, 479.
2Basten vs. Butter, 7 East. 479; Crowninshield vs. Robinson, 1 Mason, 93; Draher
vs. Randolph, 4 Harring. 454 ; Hunt vs. Otis Company, 4 Mete. 464 ; Thornton vs.
Wynn, 12 Wheat, 183; Crookshank vs. Mallory, 2 Greene, 257; 8 Humph. 678;
6 Barb. 387.
3
Farnsworth vs. Garrard, 1 Campb. 40 ; 2 Campb. 346; 2 Burr, 1802; 5 Bing.
533; 6 Mes. & W. 278; Moody, 483.
4
McAllister vs. Reab, 8 Wend. 109; 23 Pick. 284; 22 Pick. 510.
55 Hill, 63; 6 Barb. 386; 2 John. 178; 11 Wend. 106; 14 Wend. 195; 25 Wend.
107.
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upon as two distinct contracts. The right of suit attached as soon
as the sale was effected. The warranty was regarded as an executory undertaking, which the plaintiff, in his declaration, was not bound
to aver. Nor to maintain his action was he held to a proof of its
performance.1 But the warranty is now regarded as a part of the
sale, and as entering into the consideration for which the price is to
2
be given.
There seem to have been some traces at an early dayof the doctrine
of recoupment in the Law Maritime, in the form of a custom of merchants to deduct from the freights due any damage ensuing to the
3
goods through the neglect or default of the carrier.
But, in regard to this class of cases, it has never obtained any
footing in the English Maritime Law: for it was decided in the
leading case of Davidson vs. Gwynne, 12 East. 381, that the
owner could not recoup for any damage or deterioration of the
goods, on account of the negligence in the master or carrier. If
the cargo arrived, the freight became due, and the owner had to
resort to an independent action for any redress he might be entitled
to on account of the carrier's negligence. This decision has been
confirmed in the modern English cases. 4 But in this country the
damage to goods, resulting from the carrier's negligence or misconduct, has generally been allowed to be offset or recouped against his
claim for freight.' This makes our law more consistent than the
English.
In England, as well as in many of the States, it will be found
that the doctrine of recoupment has been recognized only in a limited form. Under the name of reduction of damages, the defendant
IThornton vs. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Pulsifer vs. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234; 1 J.
J. Wilson, 282.
2 4 C. B. 899; Becker vs. Vrooman, 13 John. 302; 2 Wend. 431 ; 3 Wend. 286;
4 Wend. 483; 8 Wend. 109 ;.22 Pick. 510; 1 Mason, 437; 1 Stew. & P. 71; 9 How.
U. S. 203.
31Malyn's Lex Mercatorio, 102, (1687 Ed.;) Bellamy vs. Russell, 2 Show. 167.
' Shield vs. Davies, 4 Campb. 119; Shield vs. Davies, 6 Taunt. 65; Gibson vs. Sturge,
29 Eng. L. & E. 460; S. C. 10 Ex. 622; Thomson vs. Gillespy, 5 E. & B. 209; S. C. 32
Eng. L. & E. 153.
5 Edward vs. Todd, 1 Scam. 462; Leech vs. Baldwin, 5 Watts, 446; Hinsdell vs.
Weed,.5 Denio. 172; Waring vs. Morse, 7 Ala. 313; 1 Par. Mar. L. 172.
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is allowed to show all such violations of the contract on the part
of the plaintiff as go to render the consideration less valuable ; but
if he wishes to recover damages affecting his interest in other
other respects, he must resort to an independent action.' The position taken in these cases regards recoupment only as a defense, and
not as a cross-action. The damages recouped must be for a depreciation of the consideration. The drift of American cases, as we
have already intimated, allows the defendant to recoup for any
injury which is an immediate consequence of the plaintiff's violation
of his contract, whether that violation cuts down the stipulated consideration, or affirmatively injures the defendant in other respects.
It has been maintained by some, that the law of recoupment is
not applicable to conveyances of real estate. The cases are quite
numerous in which it is laid down that the purchaser of real estate,
in defense of a suit for the purchase money, cannot recoup for a
partial failure of consideration, so far as it relates to title. It is
said, that if he obtains possession of the land, he acquires a partial
title, which is growing stronger all the time, and may eventually become perfect; that the consideration of the conveyance, while the
title is thus perfecting, cannot be said to have failed wholly; that
it would be difficult to estimate the damages of any such partial
failure, because, if he is not actually disturbed in his possession, the
title may not prove a failure after all. It has also been maintained
by some, that the purchaser should not be allowed to recoup for
such partial failure, because a court of equity, in most cases, can
afford a more complete remedy, by compelling the vendor to per2
fect the title he has assumed to convey.
I Mondel vs. Steel, 8 M. & W. 858; Stuart vs. Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Kist vs. Atkinson, 2 Campb. 63; O'Kill vs. Smith, I Stark. 107 ; Denew vs. Doverell, 3 Campb.
450; Montrio vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P. 113; Hamond vs. Holiday, 1 Car. & P. 384;
Robson vs. Godfrey, 1 Stark. 274; McCullough vs. Cox, 6 Barb. 387; Culver vs.
-Blake, 6 B. Mon. 528 ; Rooker -s. Norton, Burnett, 33 ; McAlpin vs. Lee, 12 Coon.
129 ; Runyan vs. Nichols, 11 John. 547; Grant vs. Button, 14 John. 377; Dodge
vs. Tilson, 12 Pick. 330; Harrington vs. Stratton, 22 Pick. 512; Costigan vs. Mohawk, & H. R. R. 2"Denio, 609; Hening vs. Vanhook, 8 Humph. 678; Withers vs.
Greene, 9 How. U. S. 231; Britton vs. Turner, 6 N. H. 481.
2 Frisbee vs. Hoffnagle, 13 John. 50; Greenleaf vs. Cook, 2 Wheat. 13; Wheat. vs.
Dotson, 12 Ark. 709; Key vs. Henson, 17 Ark. 254.
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A good deal of unnecessary confusion has been caused upon this
subject by regarding title and consideration as convertible terms.
After they are properly distinguished, the conflict of authorities
will prove more specious than real.
The consideration of a deed without any covenants does not, in
the absence of fraud, extend beyond the delivery of the instrument.1
If the title turns out to be worthless, this is no failure of consideration, and, therefore, there is no ground for recoupment, inasmuch
as the purchaser has obtained all the right and title the vendor had,
and this was all the latter assumed to convey. This title, which
may turn out to be defective and worthless, the vendee has taken at
his own risk. The consideration for the purchase money of a deed,
with covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, consists not only
in the actual title which the vendor has and conveys, but in the
covenants accompanying it, and guaranteeing it to be what it pur-'
-ports to be. The vendor's compliance with his warranty is a part
2
of the consideration for the contract price.
Now, if it turns out that the vendor had no title at all, the consideration for the purchase money has not failed till the vendor has
failed to comply with his warranty, or, in other words, till the covenants are broken. But it is well settled that they are not broken
till the vendee has been either actually evicted from the premises,
or constructively evicted, by having been compelled to remove an
incumbrance or purchase in an outstanding title. Until this has
happened, the vendee has no cause of action on the covenants.
Therefore, however morally certain the title may have failed, the
consideration for the purchase money has not even partially failed,
till the vendee has been legally evicted. All those cases that deny
recoupment before eviction, on the ground that there has been only
a partial failure of title till then, do not establish the proposition
that recoupment is refused because there has been only a partial
failure of consideration. Until eviction, there is no actual failure of
consideration, and therefore no ground for recoupment. Till then
no action on the covenants will lie, and no damages regarded as such
Iliawle Coy. 489, 1 Ed; Rawle Coy. 614 n. 1, 641 n. 2, 3d Ed.
Street vs. Blay, 2 Barn. & Adol. 456.

2
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by the law have been sustained. But after eviction or breach of
the covenants, the vendee, in an action for the purchase money, is
pretty generally allowed to recoup for any failure of consideration,
resulting from the plaintiff's non-compliance with his covenants.
And thus the distinction between real and personal contracts is fast
disappearing. 1
If the deed contains a covenant of seisin, the right to recoup
would depend upon the construction given to that covenant. If, as
in a few States, it is regarded as a covenant merely, that the grantor
is possessed of the land he conveys, it would be broken, if at all, as
soon as made, the damages would then accrue, and the right to
recoup also. But if, as in most of the States, it is construed to be
a covenant that the grantor is seized in fee of an indefeasible estate,
although, if broken at all, it is broken as soon as made, yet as nothing
but nominal damages can be recovered till eviction, 2 it is evident
that the right to recoup before then would be a barren defense, and
there would be no injustice in denying it till substantial damages
incident to an eviction had been sustained, when the right of crossaction substantially accrues.
It has been more generally admitted that where there is a failure
of" consideration as to the quantity or quality of the land, the pur3
chaser may recoup upon the covenants.
It would seem that in actions of replevin, the defendant could
not recoup in damages. That action consists in a claim for certain
specific chattels. The right of possession is the subject of controversy, and it is evident that such right is not answered or in anyway
affected by an offset or counter-claim for damages.4 In so far as
the action of replevin, after the decision of the right of possession,
consists in a claim for damages for detention of the property, it is
I Talmnge vs. Wallis, 25 Wend. 107 ; Whitney vs. Lewis, 21 Wend. 131 ; Mayor vs.

Mabie, 3 Kern. 151 ; Lamerson vs. Marvin, 8 Barb. 11; Knapp vs. Lee, 3 Pick.
459; Rice vs. Goddard, 14 Pick. 293 ; Pense vs. Huston, 6 Grath. 305; Grand
Lodge vs. Knox, 20 Mo. 433; 21 Mo. 415; Rawle Coy. 516, 1 Ed.
2Dickson vs. Desire, 23 Mo. 151.
3Wheat vs. Dotson, 12 Ark. 699; Key vs. Henson, 17 Ark. 254; 2 Kent Com. Lec.
39, 470; House vs. Marshall, 18 Mo. 368; Grand Lodge vs. Knox, 20 Mo. 433.
DeLeyer vs. Michaels, 5 Abbott Pr. 203.
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not so clear but that the defendant might in some such cases exercise the right of recoupment. A denial of it in such case might
imply a denial in all actions of tort, a question to whiich we shall
now devote a few remarks.
It will be observed that our definition of recoupment confines the
doctrine entirely to actions of contract. This definition undoibtedly
covers the majority of cases. The defendant can recoup only for
a breach of the contract upon which suit is brought. Such is the
import of the definition.
Now, where suit is brought upon a contract, and the defendant
answers that the plaintiff is guilty of fraud in the making of the
contract, whereby the consideration has partially failed, and the
defendant been greatly injured in other respects, for which he claims
damages, it is evident that such a case does not fall strictly within
our definition, while it is equally evident, from an examination of
the authorities, that the principle of recoupment has been applied
to this very class of cases, although the damages for the recoupment are incident to a tort connected with the contract, rather than
a breach of the contract. The law imposes the obligation of good
faith and honesty in the making of contracts, as it does in all other
transactions. But, it can hardly be said that a fraud perpetrated in
the making of a contract is a breach of the contract itself. It is a
breach of duty in regard to the contract. But however this may
be, the cases are unanimous in this country in allowing the defendant to recoup for damages incident to a fraud perpetrated by the
plaintiff in making the contract upon which he brings suit.
But this possible departure of the doctrine of recoupment from
our definition cannot be taken as authorizing it for torts generally.
The authorities are not so clear or satisfactory as might be expected
upon this, owing perhaps to the fact that as yet they are not very
numerous.
They may be classified, 1st, into actions on contracts where the
defendant has sought to recoup for some positive tort or tresspass
of the plaintiff; 2d, into actions ex delicto, where the defendant has
sought to recoup for some claim, ex contractu, connected with the
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subject-matter of the suit; 3d, into actions of tort, where he has
attempted to recoup for some tort of the plaintiff connected with
the tort upon which suit is brought. As to the first class. In the
Ase of Allaire Works vs. auion, 10 Barb. 55, the plaintiff sued
upon promissory notes given for work and labor done for the defendant. The defense was, that while the plaintiff was in the employ
of defendant as his servant, he was in possession of the defendant's
plans, models, and patterns of steam engines, which, contrary to his
duty, he destroyed. The defendant was allowed to recoup for damages incident to this wrbngful act. But the tort was also a breach
of the plaintiff's contract of hiring, and the damages allowed the
defendant were measured by that breach, and all evidence of malice
excluded. So that the recoupment after all was for a breach of contract.
In Brigham vs. Hawley, 17 Il. 38, the plaintiff declared on a
special contract, and the general counts for work and labor, and a
quantum meruit count. The defendant pleaded the general issue,
and gave special notice that the work was in quarrying stone, and
that the plaintiff, to whom quarrying tools had been delivered,
refused, on discontinuing the work, to return them, to the damage of
defendant. Recoupment for this tort was allowed, the court putting
it upon the vague ground that the demand for the tools was connected in some way with the plaintiff's cause of action. But it is
quite as evident in this as in the previous case that the plaintiff's
refusal to deliver up th6 tools constitued a breach of duty imposed
upon him by his contract of hiring.
In Cram vs. Dresser, 2 Sandf. 120, the plaintiff sued for rent.
The defendant sought to recoup for the tortious and negligent acts
of the landlord, committed by him while repairing the premises.
But the Court held that as they did not constitute a breach of any contract, they must be regarded as independent and disconnected with
the action for rent.
So in Drace vs. Cockroft, 10 How. Pr. 377, which was an
action for rent, the defendant was not allowed to recoup for the
tortious acts of the landlord in trespassing upon the premises, and
in destroying the defendant's personal property.
In Connor vs. Winton, 7 Ind. 523, the plaintiff sued for a
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deposit of money. The defendant pleaded a recoupment in
damages, on account of a slander uttered by the plaintiff, to the
effect that the defendant had stolen the deposit. The plea was
not allowed, although the tort was evidently connected with the
subject-matter of the suit. The Court, regarding the counterclaim of the code as taking the place of recoupment, took occasion
in this case to give a definition which restricts it to' contracts.
"A counter-claim is that which might have arisen out of, or could
have had some connection with, the original transactions in view
of the parties, and which at the time the contract was made they
could have intended, might, in some event, give one party a claim
against the other for compliance or non-compliance with its provisions." In Slayback vs. Jones, 9 Ind. 470, which was a suit
on a note for land and 6rops sold to the defendant, he pleaded in
defense the trespass of plaintiff in carrying off the crops which
formed a part of the consideration of the note. The defense was
not admitted, the doctrine of recoupment being considered by the
Court as applicable to contracts only.
In Tinsley vs. Tinsley, 15 B. Mon. 454, a suit on an injunction
bond given by defendant to stay execution of a writ of restitution,
he was allowed to plead in recoupment the torts of the plaintiff,
in depreciating the benefits of the stay, by threats of trespass,
which prevented the defendant from renting the premises. The
doctrine was considered applicable to any cause of action connected
with that of the plaintiff's. Now, the objection we have to this
extension of the doctrine to torts is, that no principle has yet
been found by which it can be determined how a tort must be connected with the plaintiff's cause of action, so as to constitute a
proper foundation for recoupment. Where it amounts to a breach'
of the contract, the application is very plain. The recoupment,
then, as we have already said, is not for the tort, but for the
breach.
-Next, as to actions arising ex delicto. In Stow vs. Yarwood,
14 Ill. 424, the plaintiff sued for a wrongful conversion of an
engine. The defendant was allowed to recoup a claim arising, ex
fontractu, for repairs done upon the engine.
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In De Leyer vs. Michael, 5 Abbott Pr. 203, it was said by the
Court, that a lien for charges upon property might be the fit subject for a counter-claim in an action for the conversion. But, in
most eases falling under this division, the defenses arising, ex contractu, will be found to amount to nothing more than a reduction
or mitigation of damages, by admitting in evidence the defendant's
equitable interest in or claim to the property converted. If a
disseizor erects permanent improvements, when called upon to
respond in damages, he may recoup the value of his improvements,
and yet he has no action for such improvements.'
As to the third class. It may be said that very few actions
have arisen where, in an action for a tort, the defendant has
sought to affect the claim of the plaintiff by a recoupment in
damages for another tort committed by the plaintiffs. In Lovejoy
vs. Robinson, 8 Ind. 399, we have such a case. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for a trespass caused by his cattle breaking, plaintiff's close, and destroying his crops. The defendant, by way of
counter-claim, proved that the plaintiff in driving them from the
close injured them by beating them. The damages claimed for
this injury were seventy dollars. But the recoupment was not
allowed by the Supreme Court. It was held, that torts could not
be liquidated by torts, however closely they might be connected.
The proposition that contracts cannot be liquidated by torts commands our assent with equal reason.
But even in some of the most recent cases, the doctrine of
recoupment has not been admitted to the full scope and bearing
of its merits, while in others, as we have already seen, it has been
extended beyond the limits of safe and proper application. It has
been held, that, in the absence of statutory provisions, the Court
cannot give the defendant judgment for any excess his claim for
damages may have over the demand of the plaintiff; nor is he
allowed to maintain an independent action for that excess.2 If
I Coulter's case, 5 Coke, 131.
2 Britton vs. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; 14 Ill. 424; Ward vs. Fellers, 3 Micb. 281;
McLane vs. Miller, 12 Ala. 643; Batterman vs. Price, 3 Hill, 171; Brunson vs.
Martin, 17 Ark. 270.
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recoupment be regarded as a cross-action, as it is in modern cases,
we can see no reason why the defendant's cross-claim for damages
should not be recognized to its full extent, and judgment given for
any excess it may justly have over the plaintiff's. The contrary
rule certainly curtails materially the usefulness of the doctrine,
by discouraging it whenever the balance of damages may be
greatly in favor of the defendant. In such case, if circuity of
action is avoided, it is only at the defendant's sacrifice of a part
of his demand.
He is allowed judgment for excess in Louisiana under the law of
reconvention)
This is now the practice in New York, and it will
probably become the practice in those States whose laws allow the
2
Court to render affirmative relief to the defendant.
It seems to be well settled that, in the absence of statutory provisions, it is optional with the defendant whether he shall plead his
cross-claim by way of recoupment, or resort to an independent action
for its enforcement. It is a privilege, and he is not estopped in
one suit by having failed to exercise it in another.3 Where the action
is upon a quantum meruit, it may be difficult sometimes to determine whether an exercise of the privilege is not so implied in the
nature of the case as to estop its further employment. 4 Indeed, it
has been laid down by some Courts, that recoupment is not applicable at all to actions on the quantum meruit counts.5
Payment after action brought, although never pleadable in defense
of the action, was usually admitted in reduction of damages.6 But
the defendant can never recoup for damages suffered since action
1 Miller vs. Stewart, 12 La. An. 170.

Ogden vs. Codington, 2 E. D. Smith, 310; Moore vs. Caruthers, 7 B. Mon. 681.
Naylor vs. Schenck, 3 E. D. Smith, 135; McKinney vs. Springer, 3 Ind. 59;
Rankin vs. Harper, 4 Ind. 85; MeLane vs. Miller, 12 Ala. 643; Grant vs. Button,
14 John. 379; Cook vs. Mosely, 13 Wend. 277; Fabricotti vs. Launitz, 3 Sandf. 743;
Hall vs. Clark, 21 Mo. 415.
4 Bellinger vs. Craigne, 31 Barb. 534.
5 Steamer Wellsville vs. Guisse, 3 0. St. 333.
6Pemigewassett vs. Brocket, 4 N. H. 5.57; Bischoff vs. Lucas, 6 Ind. 26; Shily rs.
Jacobs, 2 Bing. N. C. 88 ; Ledoir vs. Boucher, 7 Car. & P. 1 ; Richardson vs. Robinson, 1 M. & IV. 463.
2
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brought.' This restriction seems to be adopted in analogy to the
common law rule, that the plaintiff could not give evidence of or
declare for damages suffered since the suit was instituted. 2 It
may be questioned whether this is not a misapplication of the rule.
If the doctrine of recoupment is to be restricted to a mere reduction
of the plaintiff's claim, as in England, we see no reason why evidence
of injury sustained or contract broken since action commenced should
not be admissible in reduction of damages, on the same ground that
payment is admitted. And, on the other hand, if recoupment is to
be regarded as a cross-action, the rule that damage suffered after
action brought is not admissible in evidence, would not necessarily
restrain the defendant from pleading any breach of the contract
happening before he filed his plea or answer, or gave notice of
special matter, which is the commencement of his action.
There has been some difference of opinion in regard to the mode
in which the defense or claim of recoupment should be pleaded.
Under the old common law system of pleading, the evidence of the
facts relied upon for recoupment, if going to show a total failure of
consideration, might be given under the general issue without any
notice. But if it went to show only a partial failure of consideration, notice of it was required to prevent surprise.3
Under that system, it seems to have been recognized only in the
form of a reduction of damages, and not as a defense or cross-action.
It was neither a plea in bar nor in abatement. Nor could it be made
a plea in bar by an allegation of damages sustained equal to the
plaintiff's claim, for it admitted the cause of action. It was only a
partial defense, and therefore did not constitute a plea. And, like
all partial defenses that went to a reduction or mitigation of the
plaintiff's claim, it was always admitted under the general issue. In
other words, although a recoupment of damages, if pleaded, would not
'20 Eng. L. and Eq. 277, Bartlett vs. Holmes; Harger vs. Edmunds, 4 Barb. 256.
2 Chitty P1. 339; Gordon vs. Kennedy, 2 Binn. 287; 4 Barb. 256.

* McCullough vs. Cox, 6 Barb. 386; Mayor vs. Trowbridge, 5 Hill, 71; Batterman vs. Price, 3 Hill, 171; Barber vs. Rose, 5 Hill, 76; Whilbeck vs. Skinner, 7 Hill,
53; Stearns vs. Marsh, 4 Denio. 227; Eldridge vs. Mather, 2 Corns. 157; Britton vs.
Turner, 6 N. H. 497; Estep vs. Morton, 6 Ind 489; Heaston vs. Colgrove, 3 Ind. 265.
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constitute a denial of the action brought, yet it was always admitted
in evidence to sustain such denial.' But, under the new system of
practice prevailing in many of the States, and fashioned more or
less after the New York Code, there is no general issue. The
defendant is required to set out the facts which constitute his defense.
There being no general issue to which a notice is subsidiary, he is
required to plead his defense, whether it be a perfect or partial one.
If partial, it is held good as a defense pro tanto.2
Where a recoupment of damages has been pleaded by the defendant, it is not always within the discretion of the plaintiff to dismiss
his action so as to terminate the prosecution of the defendant's crossclaim. 3 A discontinuance will not be allowed where it results in
materially prejudicing the rights of the defendant.
Recoupment proper stops with the right of cross.action arising
out of the same contract upon which suit is brought. Under*the
name of counter-claim, this right has been extended by statutes in
some of the States to causes of action arising upon any other contract, and existing at the time suit is instituted. It will be found
that very different views have been taken of the scope and meaning
of these statutes. In their present unsettled state a reference to
them will be sufficient.'
A. M.

2

Wilmarth vs. Babcock, 2 Hill, 194; 5 Hill, 76; Iterkimer vs. Small, 21 Wend. 278.
6 How. rr. 433 ; Bush vs. Prosser-, 1 Kern. 352 ; Houghton vs. Townshend, 8 How.

Pr. 441; 'McKerying vs. Bull, 16 N. Y. Rep. 299; House vs. Marshall, 18 Mo. 368.
2 Van Alen vs. Schermerhorn, 14 How. Pr. 287; Cockle vs. Underwood, 1 Ab.
Pr. 1; Seaboard & Roanoke R. R. vs. Ward, 18 Barb. 59-5.
4 Hill vs. Butler, 6 0. St. 207; Lemon vs. Trull, 13 How. Pr. 248; Gleason vs.
Mean, 2 Duer, 642; 9 Ind. 470; 8 Ind. 401; 10 How. Pr. 377.
Pr. 94; Nasb. Pl. and Pr. 75; Ky. Code Pr. 95.
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